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Abstract According to the default interventionist dual-
process account of reasoning, belief-based responses to rea-
soning tasks are based on Type 1 processes generated by de-
fault, which must be inhibited in order to produce an effortful,
Type 2 output based on the validity of an argument. However,
recent research has indicated that reasoning on the basis of
beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as this account claims.
In three experiments, we presented participants with a reason-
ing task that was to be completed while they were generating
random numbers (RNG). We used the novel methodology
introduced by Handley, Newstead & Trippas (Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 37, 28–43, 2011), which required participants to
make judgments based upon either the validity of a condition-
al argument or the believability of its conclusion. The results
showed that belief-based judgments produced lower rates of
accuracy overall and were influenced to a greater extent than
validity judgments by the presence of a conflict between belief
and logic for both simple and complex arguments. These find-
ings were replicated in Experiment3, in which we controlled
for switching demands in a blocked design. Across all three
experiments, we found a main effect of RNG, implying that
both instructional sets require some effortful processing.
However, in the blocked design RNG had its greatest impact
on logic judgments, suggesting that distinct executive
resources may be required for each type of judgment. We
discuss the implications of our findings for the default inter-
ventionist account and offer a parallel competitive model as an
alternative interpretation for our findings.
Keywords Reasoning .Workingmemory . Deductive
reasoning . Individual differences . Problem solving .
Decisionmaking
Many theorists in the fields of reasoning and decision making
have argued that thinking is characterized by the action of two
distinctive cognitive systems. Such accounts are referred to as
dual-process theories and have been developed in a number of
areas, including learning (e.g., Reber, 1996), attention (Shiffrin
& Schneider, 1977), reasoning (Evans, 2003), decision mak-
ing (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), and social cognition
(Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Associated with these distinct cog-
nitive systems are different processing characteristics. Evans,
(2009) suggested that these processes can be classified as
Type 1—fast, automatic, unconscious, and effortless by na-
ture—and Type 2—slow, controlled, conscious, effortful, and
demanding on the working memory. In other areas of research,
these processes have been variously referred to as intuitive or
rational, automatic or deliberative, or heuristic or analytic
(Evans, 2009; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 1999). For the pur-
poses of this article, we employ Evans’s (2009) classification
and terminology of Type 1 and Type 2 processes throughout.
According to the default interventionist dual-process ac-
count of reasoning (detailed in Evans & Stanovich 2013),
Type 1 processes are assumed to yield default, automatically
cued responses that may be based upon beliefs, learned asso-
ciations, heuristics, or stereotypes. These responses can be
resisted or intervened on by conscious and deliberative
higher-order reasoning processes (Type 2); however,
* Stephanie Howarth
stephanie.howarth@plymouth.ac.uk
Simon J. Handley
S.Handley@plymouth.ac.uk
Clare Walsh
clare.walsh@plymouth.ac.uk
1 Department of Psychology, Plymouth University, Drake Circus,
Plymouth, Devon PL4 8AA, UK
DOI 10.3758/s13421-015-0555-x
Mem Cogn (2016) 44:330–349
Published online: 21        September 2015
producing an alternative response often requires cognitive ef-
fort and the inhibition of Type 1 outputs (Handley, Capon,
Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 2004). As a result, our initial
intuitive response to a problem is often accepted (Stanovich,
2009). It is worth noting that biased responding can also arise
through Type 2 processes when there is limited engagement of
reflective processing; furthermore, Evans & Stanovich (2013)
have argued that there is always some degree of Type 2 pro-
cessing in response generation, even if it is minimal. However,
under all default interventionist accounts of reasoning, a pro-
totypical example of frugal reasoning that has established it-
self as a significant phenomenon and is often cited as support-
ive of dual-process accounts is the Bbelief-bias^ effect.
Belief bias reflects the tendency for individuals to generate
and authenticate a conclusion on the basis of their beliefs
rather than of the logical structure of an argument. Take, for
example, the following problem as an illustration of the con-
flict between belief- and logic-based reasoning:
All plants need water
Roses need water
Does it follow that roses are plants?
The instructions given in reasoning studies generally re-
quire the participants to determine whether the conclusion
follows logically from the premises. In this example, the con-
clusion does not logically follow, but it is consistent with our
beliefs. According to default interventionist accounts, our be-
liefs are cued by default, often leading to high endorsement
rates for these types of conclusions.
It is claimed that individuals often experience a cognitive
struggle between what they believe is true about the world and
what is logically entailed. This is often reflected in reduced
reasoning accuracy and increased latencies on problems in
which beliefs and logic conflict, even when participants are
given explicit instructions to reason on the basis of the logical
structure of the argument (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). It
has been claimed that prior beliefs are extremely difficult to
override and compete for control over the responses made
(Evans, 2003). Consequently, the conflict between whether
or not individuals believe the conclusion or agree with its
logical validity is often resolved in favor of what they find
believable, which has been considered a reliable support for
a default-based system in reasoning (Evans, 2007).
A number of findings appear to support the notion
that the believability of a conclusion is automatically
available, and thus preempts logical analysis (Evans
et al., 1983; Stanovich, 1999). Syllogistic-reasoning
studies carried out under limited time appear to increase
the occurrence of belief bias (Evans & Curtis-Holmes,
2005). Increasing cognitive load by adding a demanding
secondary task to be completed alongside the reasoning
task also increases the belief-bias effect (De Neys,
2006). Furthermore, those with higher cognitive ability
are able to resolve conflict more readily and to resist a
belief-based response (Stanovich & West, 1998). This
suggests that informants who lack the resources to re-
view and uphold an alternate argument in their working
memory, or an argument that is decontextualized in na-
ture, are more likely to lead to an automatic, Type 1
output.
Default-processing accounts tend to emphasize the pre-
emptive impact that prior beliefs have on our decision-
making processes, often leading them astray (Evans, 2006).
In contrast, recent research has indicated that reasoning on the
basis of beliefs may not be as fast and automatic as these
accounts claim. For example, belief bias on simple reasoning
tasks is unaffected by a speeded problem presentation (Evans,
Handley, & Bacon, 2009), and measures of belief bias in rea-
soning do not consistently correlate with cognitive capacity
measures (Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly,
2004). Furthermore, developmental research has shown that
among preadolescent children, biased responding on reason-
ing tasks is more, rather than less, common in participants
who score higher on measures of fluid intelligence and work-
ing memory (Morsanyi & Handley, 2008). One explanation
for these findings is that reasoning about beliefs may often be
an effortful process, relying on the activation of relevant
knowledge and integration with a novel problem structure in
order to arrive at a judgment informed by relevant beliefs. In
addition to this, there is evidence that outcomes normally at-
tributed to Type 2 processes, such as reasoning on the basis of
logical structure, can be achieved by automatic, fast (i.e.,
Type 1) processes (Rader & Sloutsky, 2002) and can be drawn
without awareness (Leo & Greene, 2008). The claim that log-
ical reasoning can be accomplished automatically is also sup-
ported by recent research that has suggested that participants
automatically detect logic–belief conflict, even when this is
resolved in favor of belief-based responding (De Neys, 2012).
A common feature of the studies that have examined the
impact of beliefs on reasoning is that the instructions typically
require participants to assume that the premises are true and to
draw conclusions on the basis of the premises’ logical validity.
One possibility is that belief bias arises, not because of the
default generation of knowledge-consistent responses, but be-
cause of a failure to appropriately apply the instructional set.
In a series of experiments, Handley, Newstead, and Trippas
(2011) examined the accuracy and time course of processing
when participants were instructed to respond on the basis of
either logical validity or the believability of a given conclu-
sion. The believability of the conclusion was evaluated with
respect to empirical beliefs—for example,
All zabs can walk.
Whales are zabs.
Therefore, whales can walk.
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This novel methodology allowed a direct test of the default
interventionist account, which would predict that when partic-
ipants were asked to makes judgments of conclusion believ-
ability, as opposed to conclusion validity, responses should
both be more accurate and take less time. Their findings con-
sistently showed that belief-based judgments take significant-
ly longer than those made under logical instructions and that
judgments relating to strongly held beliefs could themselves
be undermined if they were inconsistent with the logical struc-
ture of an argument (Handley et al., 2011). These findings
were interpreted as showing that certain logical inferences
are accomplished relatively automatically and are immune to
the influence of beliefs. This pattern is contrary to what would
be expected if belief-based judgments were based on fast,
automatic Type 1 processes and logic-based judgments were
based on slow, deliberate Type 2 processes, indicating that the
distinction between Type 1 and Type 2 processes is far from
clear.
An alternative dual-process theory, contrasting with the
default interventionist framework, is the parallel-processing
model. This model is common in social psychology
(Chaiken & Trope, 1999) but has also been applied to the
judgment and decision-making literature (Sloman, 1996).
According to the parallel competitive account, Type 1 and
Type 2 processes are initiated at the same time and operate
in competition with each other. The process that completes
first prompts a response that may need to be inhibited in
favor of a more appropriate, yet less rapid, one. However,
inhibition of the first response will depend on the
instructions, the resources available, and the time it takes for
each process to complete. Handley and Trippas (2015) have
recently developed a new parallel-processing account that as-
sumes that logical and belief-based judgments draw upon both
Type 1 and Type 2 processes, but that the extent of competi-
tion depends on the complexity of each type of judgment, and
hence the extent to which an alternative available response
must be resisted in favor of additional processing. This ac-
count is a useful framework for understanding Handley
et al.’s findings, if we assume that certain reasoning problems
prompt a rapid logical response (as opposed to a default,
belief-based response) that requires inhibition when one is
presented with a belief-based instructional set (Handley
et al., 2011).
These more recent findings (Handley et al. 2011) suggest
that on certain tasks, belief-based judgments should be just as
affected by speeded tasks and secondary loads as logical judg-
ments are. This proposal is the foundation for the three exper-
iments presented in this article. The present research imple-
ments the original methodology of Handley et al. (2011),
which allowed us to evaluate the degree to which logic and
beliefs interfere with one another while participants engage in
a secondary task. The default interventionist model, which
highlights the sequential nature of processing—in which
Type 1 precedes Type 2 processing (Evans, 2006, 2011)—
predicts that performance on belief-based judgments (early
responses) should be unaffected by the secondary task. The
parallel competitive model, on the other hand (see also
Handley & Trippas, 2015), predicts that belief judgments
should be affected by the secondary task as much as logic
judgments are. We examined this prediction across three ex-
periments, which include both simple and more complex ar-
guments, as well as individual difference measures associated
with effortful processing.
Random number generation (RNG) has been one of the
most commonly used methods to explore the role of the cen-
tral executive component of working memory in cognitive
tasks. RNG is thought to draw on a number of executive
functions, including Binhibition^ and memory Bupdating^
(Miyake et al. 2000). It has been well established that the
generation of random responses is disrupted by and impedes
simultaneously performed, attention-demanding secondary
t a s k s ( B a d d e l e y, 1 9 8 6 ; B r own , S o l i v e r i , &
Jahanshahi,1998), including syllogistic reasoning (Gilhooly,
Logie, Wetherick, & Wynn, 1993). Our aim was to examine
whether belief-based reasoning would be disrupted by a sec-
ondary load that interferes with Type 2 processes, such as the
engagement in random number generation.
Experiment 1
In Experiment1, we examined whether applying a secondary
load would have a greater impact on belief or logic judgments
on simple modus ponens (MP) arguments—in particular,
when the believability and logical validity of a conclusion
were in conflict. If logic judgments are more resource-de-
manding, in accordance with the default interventionist ac-
count, we would expect them to be influenced more than
belief-based judgments would be; alternatively, if belief-
based judgments also engage Type 2 processing, then they
should also be affected by RNG.
Method
Participants
A total of 90 participants took part in Experiment1: 56 were
women and 36 were men (mean age= 31 years). Seventy-six
of the participants were paid £4 each, and 14 were awarded
course credits for their time.
Design and materials
A 2 (Instruction) × 2 (Problem Type) × 2 (Load) mixed design
was used, in which participants were randomly assigned to the
RNG (load) or control (no load) group. Each participant was
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presented with the same 64 conditional reasoning problems in
MP format. Of these problems, 32 were presented under belief
instruction and 32 under logical instruction (Instruction Type
factor). In each of these sets were 16 conflict problems (with
conclusions that were valid and unbelievable or invalid and
believable) and 16 no-conflict problems (with conclusions
that were valid and believable or invalid and unbelievable).
In each case, eight problems required a Byes^ response or a
press of the Bs^ key on the key board, and eight problems
required a Bno^ response or a press of the Bk^ key.
Reasoning task The reasoning task was presented on a com-
puter screen; Table 1 demonstrates the type of questions pre-
sented to each participant. Argument 1 shows that the conclu-
sion of the argument logically follows from the premise but is
in conflict with beliefs. In Argument 3, the conclusion is be-
lievable but the conclusion does not follow logically. For
Arguments 2 and 4, the logical validity and believability of
the conclusion coincide, and hence there is no conflict. The
conclusion to each of the invalid arguments (Arguments 3 and
4 in Table 1) involves the denial of the consequent clause. In
order to avoid an association between validity and explicit
negation, antonyms were used in the conclusion clause.
We created 16 scenarios of the kind shown in Table 1, with
four items within each scenario: two conflict and two no-
conflict items. To counterbalance the problems, one group of
participants were presented with a conflict and a no-conflict
item from each scenario under belief instructions and the re-
maining two items under logic instructions, whereas the sec-
ond group were presented with the same scenarios and items
under different instructions (see Appendix A for the full set of
problems used). Thus, participants received equal numbers of
belief-based and logic-based questions, equal numbers of log-
ically valid and invalid conclusions, and equivalent numbers
of Byes^ and Bno^ responses.
For each problem, the first premise was presented on the
computer screen for a total of 3,000 ms and remained on the
screen to ensure that participants had enough time to read and
understand the first premise before the second premise, con-
clusion, and response options appeared together. Before the
experiment started, four practice trials were presented, which
covered all four argument types (see Table 1).
Random number generation The RNG task was based on
the methodology used by Miyake et al. (2000). Participants
were instructed to say aloud a number between 1 and 9 every
second for the entire duration of the experiment. They were
instructed to continue generating random numbers while solv-
ing the reasoning problems. To ensure that they understood the
concept of Brandom,^ they were given the following example:
Suppose you had written the numbers 1–9 on pieces of
paper and put them in a hat. You take out one piece of
paper, call out the number and return it to the hat. Then
you reach for another piece of paper and do the same
thing. The series of numbers you call out in that way
should be random. (Horne, Evans, & Orne, 1982)
Before the start of the experiment, they were told to keep
the generation of numbers continuous; although it was tempt-
ing to pause while reading the questions, they had to keep
generating a number every second to the sound of the metro-
nome beat. Theywere also advised that if they accidently went
beyond the number range 1–9, they should try not to pause,
but should continue on.
Procedure
Participants were tested in maximum groups of four and were
randomly assigned to one of two conditions: RNG (load) or
the control group (no load).
They were tested in partitioned booths behind closed doors
to keep vocalized distractions to a minimum. Participants in
both the RNG and control groups wore closed-cup earphones
to reduce background noise, but only the RNG group listened
to a metronome beat that was set to click every second.
Participants were informed that they would have to com-
plete 64 reasoning problems and were instructed to answer
either according to their beliefs or according to logic. Belief
instructions emphasized the requirement to answer in relation
to their knowledge of what is true in the world and to indicate
whether the conclusion was believable or unbelievable. They
were then presented with following example:
If you finish your drink then the glass will be full.
Suppose you finish your drink.
Does it follow that the glass will be full?
s) BELIEVABLE k) UNBELIEVABLE
Table 1 Examples of the different types of modus ponens (MP) argu-
ments used in Experiments 1–3
Conflict Arguments No-Conflict Arguments
Argument 1 Argument 2
If it is raining then the street is dry. If it is raining then the street is wet.
It is raining. It is raining.
(A) The street is dry. (C) The street is wet.
Logic: ✓ Belief: X Logic: ✓ Belief: ✓
Argument 3 Argument 4
If it is raining then the street is dry. If it is raining then the street is wet.
It is raining. It is raining.
(B) The street is wet. (D) The street is dry.
Logic: X Belief: ✓ Logic: X Belief: X
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The correct answer according to beliefs is UNBELIEV-
ABLE because, based upon your knowledge of the
world, you know that if you finish your drink then the
glass will be empty; therefore, the conclusion is
unbelievable.
The logic instructions asked participants to assume each
statement was true (even if in reality it was not true) and to
indicate whether the conclusion followed validly from the
preceding sentences. They were then presented with the same
example under logic instructions:
If you finish your drink then the glass will be full.
Suppose you finish your drink.
Does it follow that the glass will be empty?
s) VALID k) INVALID
In this particular example, the correct answer according
to logic is INVALID, because the first premise states that
Bif you finish your drink then the glass will be full,^ and
supposing that you Bfinish your drink,^ you must logi-
cally conclude that your glass will be full. This is why
the conclusion Bthe glass will be empty^ is logically
invalid.
In the RNG group, each participant had a dictaphone
placed in front of the keyboard to capture the articulation of
numbers. The control group only had the reasoning task in-
structions to adhere to, but the RNG group had separate in-
structions for the secondary task. Response latencies were
logged from the presentation of the full problem until a re-
sponse was given.
Analyzing randomness The RGCalc program (Towse &
Neil, 1998) was used to analyze the randomness of the num-
bers generated by each participant in the high-load condition.
The program produces many different indices needed to ex-
amine randomness, but the three main measures used here
were taken from Towse and Valentine (1997) and are as
follows:
Redundancy: A score of 0% means each response alter-
native is given with equal frequency, whereas 100%
means the same response has been selected too often
throughout—for example, 2,2,2,2.
RNG= random number generation: This measures how
often a response alternative follows another. The closer
that RNG is to 100%, the more predictable the pair
sequence.
Adjacency: This measures a specific type of sequential
pairing, in contrast to the RNG analysis—for example,
the commonality of 1,2 or 3,2 (neighboring pairs on the
number line). A score of 0% means that no neighboring
pairs were presented, whereas 100%means all successive
responses were adjacent number values. In Experiment
1, the three measures were used as a check to ensure that
participants engaged in the secondary task. A score of
50% or higher on two out of the three randomness indices
was set as the criterion for eliminating participants not
sufficiently engaging executive resources, although no
participants were eliminated on these grounds. The aver-
age scores for the randomness indices were 3% for redun-
dancy, 50% for RNG, and 40% for adjacency. Three par-
ticipants were removed from the analysis because they
took longer than 2 s per number generation.
Results
We analyzed the full data set before removing the data from 20
participants: three for taking longer than 2 s to generate num-
bers, and 17 for scoring below chance on the conflict prob-
lems (i.e., less than 50% accurate), suggesting that they were
applying an inappropriate instructional set to the questions
(Handley et al. 2011). This gave us totals of N= 35 in the
RNG group and N= 35 in the control group. We focus on
the reduced data throughout this article, although the pattern
of findings from the full and reduced data sets did not differ
meaningfully. All of the accuracy data were arcsine-
transformed to improve the homogeneity of the variances
and to control for the impact of ceiling effects. Analysis of
the latency data was performed on correct responses only, and
any missing data were replaced with the overall cell mean for
that question type (i.e., belief conflict, belief no-conflict). The
latencies were then stripped by two standard deviations to
remove outliers and ensure a more even distribution of the
means. The tables throughout this article present response
latencies with outliers removed and percentage accuracy
scores, prior to transformation. For this experiment, see
Table 2. Missing and stripped data accounted for no more than
4% of the overall data.
A 2 (Instructions: belief/logic) × 2 (Problem Type: conflict/
no conflict) × 2 (Load: RNG/control) mixed-design analysis
of variance (ANOVA) on the accuracy scores revealed a main
effect of problem type, F(1, 68)= 73.274, p< .001, ηp
2= .519,
showing poorer performance on conflict items (80% vs. 94%).
We also observed a main effect of instructions, F(1, 68)=
16.436, p< .001, ηp
2= .195, with logic judgments producing
the most accurate scores (90% vs. 84%). There was also a
main effect of load, F(2, 68)= 4.917, p= .030, ηp
2= .067,
which showed that RNG did affect performance relative to
the control group (84% vs. 89%). However, none of the inter-
actions were significant (all ps> .10).
For the response latencies in Experiment1, no main effect
of instructions emerged, F(1, 68)= 1.956, p= .166, ηp
2= .028,
but conflict problems did take longer to complete than no-
conflict problems (7,386 vs. 6,797 ms), producing a
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significant main effect of problem type, F(1, 68)= 9.335, p=
.003, ηp
2= .121. We found a main effect of load, F(2, 68)=
20.709, p< .001, ηp
2= .233, demonstrating a significant in-
crease in latencies when participants were engaged in RNG
(8,280 vs. 5,902 ms). There was also an interaction between
instruction and problem type, F(1, 68)= 8.340, p= .005, ηp
2=
.109. Follow-up analyses showed that the impact of conflict
was significant for belief judgments, F(1, 68)= 19.831, p<
.001, ηp
2= .226, but not for logic judgments, F(1, 68)=
0.028, p= .869, ηp
2< .001. However, instructions did not in-
teract with load, F(1, 68)= .093, p= .761, ηp
2= .001; therefore,
load had similar impacts on the latencies for both belief and
logic judgments. Finally, none of the remaining interactions
were significant (all ps> .10).
Discussion
The results from this experiment showed that although partic-
ipants were more accurate under logic instructions, random
number generation had an impact on overall accuracy scores
and significantly increased response times. Although partici-
pants were less accurate in the RNG group, the secondary load
had a similar impact under both instructional sets. These find-
ings are inconsistent with the default interventionist account
and suggest that effortful processing is required under both
types of instructions.
It has been argued that MP inferences are drawn automat-
ically through direct rules of inference (Braine & O’Brien
1991) that can be triggered by subliminal stimuli and carried
out automatically, even without instructions (Reverberi,
Burigo, & Cherubini, 2009; Reverberi, Pischedda, Burigo,
& Cherubini, 2012; Rips, 1988). However, in Experiment1,
MP arguments were influenced, albeit to a small extent, by a
secondary load, which suggests that they are not implicit in
nature. It could be argued, nevertheless, that the effect of load
was the result of RNG interfering with other aspects of
information processing, such as response selection or genera-
tion, rather than the activation of a relevant inference rule. In
Experiment2, we introduced a set of more complex arguments
in order to examine whether the impact of our secondary task
would increase with increased problem complexity.
Experiment 2
Thus far, we have established that RNG affects belief judg-
ments and logic-based MP inferences, suggesting that both
judgments depend on Type 2 processing and draw upon ex-
ecutive resources. Furthermore, the findings replicate earlier
research in showing that that logic-based inferences produce
higher accuracy scores than judgments based on belief. One
explanation for the higher logic scores could be that with MP
arguments, a valid conclusion would be a direct match to the
content of the consequent in the major premise. This poten-
tially provides a shortcut for making a validity judgment that
would not require integration of the minor premise. Such a
shortcut could explain why participants respond more rapidly
under logic instructions and are only marginally affected by a
secondary task. To rule out this possibility, disjunctive
arguments can be used, whereby the conclusion does not
directly match a proposition within the major premise. The
use of disjunctive arguments would also allow us to
determine whether the findings can be extended to these
more complex inferences. Reverberi et al. (2012) found that
disjunctive arguments did not produce the same priming ef-
fects as MP arguments, proposing that disjunctions require
more effortful processing. Additionally, Handley et al.
(2011) replicated their initial findings using disjunctive argu-
ments. Using more complex arguments, we would expect to
find that they are harder to reasonwith (Johnson-Laird, Byrne,
& Schaeken, 1992) and would produce poorer accuracy scores
overall. With regard to instruction type, the parallel
Table 2 Experiment1: Average accuracy and latency scores for belief and logic instructions across both conditions
Variable Belief Instructions Logic Instructions Overall Means
Conflict No Conflict Conflict No Conflict
RNG
Average response (%) 70 90 81 93 84
Latency (ms) 9,017 7,761 8,012 8,331 8,280
Control
Average response (%) 80 93 87 96 89
Latency (ms) 6,575 5,568 5,939 5,526 5,902
Mean accuracy (%)
(across each cell)
75 92 84 95
Mean latency (ms)
(across each cell)
7,796 6,665 6,976 6,929
The results exclude below-chance scores and include correct only latencies. RNG= random number generation (N= 35), control (N= 35)
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competitive account would predict that both belief and logic
judgments would be affected by load, whereas the default
interventionist account would expect load to have a greater
impact on logic-disjunctive arguments under logical
instructions.
Our second aim was to examine the extent to which indi-
vidual differences in reflective processing are associated with
performance under different instructions. Individual-
difference studies have shown that limitations in working
memory are key to explaining reasoning performance
(Capon, Handley, & Dennis, 2003). They have established
that limitations to an individual’s effortful processing can pre-
dict logical reasoning (Evans&Over, 1996; Stanovich, 1999).
Furthermore, belief-bias studies have demonstrated how dif-
ferent types of reasoning can produce different cognitive de-
mands (Stanovich & West, 2000). With regard to the present
study, we are interested in the extents to which belief- and
logic-based reasoning are associated with performance on
the cognitive reflection task (CRT).
Frederick (2005) introduced the CRT as a measure of an
individual’s ability to suppress and disregard initial intuitive
responses, in order to arrive at the correct, deliberated answer.
The three-item questionnaire is said to be a good predictor of
the tendency to use heuristics and biases in making judgments
and can explain more variance than the typical measures of
cognitive ability: executive functioning and thinking disposi-
tions (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). Toplak et al. de-
scribed the CRT as a measure that can assess the inclination
toward Bmiserly processing,^ which corresponds to Type 1
processes in the dual-process literature (De Neys &
Glumicic, 2008; Evans, 2008; Kahneman & Frederick,
2002; Sloman, 1996). With this measure, we will look at the
relationship between CRT scores, which reflect effortful pro-
cessing, and judgments made on the basis of the validity of the
argument or its believability.
Method
Participants
A total of 80 undergraduates from the University of Plymouth
(15 males and 65 females, mean age= 23 years) took part in
Experiment2, in exchange for course credits.
Design and materials
A 2 (Instruction) × 2 (Problem Type) × 2 (Complexity) × 2
(Load) mixed design was used, in which participants were
randomly assigned to the RNG (load) or control (no load)
group. Each participant received 128 reasoning problems,
bothMP and disjunctive arguments (Complexity factor) under
both belief and logic instructions (Instruction Type), which
consisted of both conflict and no-conflict problems (Problem
Type). See Table 3 for more details, and Appendix B for a
complete set of the stimuli.
Reasoning task The same 64 MP conditionals from
Experiments 1 were used in Experiment2, with an additional
64 disjunctive arguments. The disjunctives consisted of equal
numbers of two types of argument: denial inferences (see
Disjunctive Type A in Table 3), in which the categorical pre-
mise denies one of the propositions in the major premise and
the conclusion affirms the remaining one, and affirmation
inferences, in which the categorical premise affirms one of
the propositions in the major premise and the conclusion de-
nies the remaining one (see Disjunctive Type B, Table 3). The
use of both denial and affirmation inferences ensured that
there would be no confounds between the polarity of the con-
clusion (i.e., whether it was negative or affirmative) and log-
ical validity.
The disjunctives, like the MPs, consisted of 16 scenarios
with two conflict and two no-conflict items within each sce-
nario. As in Experiment1, counterbalancing the problems re-
quired one group of participants to be presented with a conflict
and a no-conflict item from each scenario under belief instruc-
tions and the remaining two items under logic instructions,
and the second group was presented with the same scenarios
and items under different instructions. Again, each participant
received equal numbers of belief-based and logic-based ques-
tions and equal numbers of logically valid and invalid conclu-
sions, along with additional practice trials to include the dis-
junctive arguments, as displayed in Table 3.
Random number generationWe used the samemethod as in
Experiment1. The average scores for the randomness indices
were 3% for redundancy, 60% for RNG, and 40% for
adjacency.
Individual difference measures The CRT consisted of the
following three questions:
& A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00
more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
& If it takes five machines 5 min to make five widgets, how
long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?...
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ....
& In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the
entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover
half of the lake?... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... The
CRT was administered in paper format, and participants
were required to note down their answers next to each
question.
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Procedure
The instructions were the same as in Experiment1. After par-
ticipants had completed the reasoning part of the experiment,
they were presented with the CRT questions. No time limit
was given for completing these questions.
The CRT results were calculated by separating the partici-
pants into two groups, the high-CRT group (n= 29), which
consisted of those that scored 1 or more out of 3, and the low-
CRT group (n= 43), for those that failed to give a correct
answer (see, e.g., Frederick, 2005).
Results
Consistent with Experiment 1, we eliminated those who
scored 50% or below on the conflict items for both the RNG
and control groups (8 in total). We also removed participants
who took longer than 2 s on average to generate random num-
bers, on the basis that they were not adequately engaged in the
secondary task. In total, 13 participants were eliminated, three
for exceeding an average of 2 s per number generation, and
two for producing stereotyped sequences, which gave a total
of N= 31 for the RNG group and N= 36 for the control group.
A 2 (Instructions: belief/logic) × 2 (Problem Type: conflict/no
conflict) × 2 (Complexity: MP/disjunctives) × 2 (Load: RNG/
control) mixed design ANOVA was carried out on accuracy
measures that were arcsine-transformed. The analysis showed a
main effect of instructions, F(1, 65)= 19.266, p< .001,
ηp
2= .229, with logic judgments producing the most accurate
scores across both groups (87% vs. 81%). A main effect of
problem type, F(1, 65)= 66.225, p< .001, ηp
2= .505, reflected
poorer performance on conflict than on nonconflict items (78%
vs. 90%). There was also a main effect of complexity, F(1, 65)=
43.964, p< .001, ηp
2= .403, in whichMP items produced higher
accuracy scores than disjunctive arguments (87% vs. 81%), and
a main effect of load, F(2, 65)= 13.193, p< .001, ηp
2= .169,
demonstrating that performance was poorer under load (80%
vs. 88%). However, load did not interact significantly with in-
structions, F(1, 65)= 1.968, p= .165, ηp
2= .029.
We also observed an interaction between instructions and
problem type, F(1, 65)= 20.278, p< .001, ηp
2= .239, showing
a bigger impact of conflict on belief problems (72% conflict vs.
90% no-conflict) than on logic problems (84% conflict vs. 90%
no conflict). In order to establish whether this interaction was
present for both MP and disjunctives, we carried out two sep-
arate 2 (Problem Type) × 2 (Instructions) repeated measures
ANOVAs on the two argument types. The results revealed that
Table 3 Examples of the Disjunctive arguments used in Experiments 2 and 3
Conflict Arguments No-Conflict Arguments
Disjunctive Type A Disjunctive Type A
Argument 1 Argument 2
Either the sun is yellow or it is blue. Either the sea is blue or it is pink.
Suppose the sun is not yellow. Suppose the sea is not pink.
Does it follow that the sun is blue? Does it follow that the sea is blue?
Logic: ✓ Belief: X Logic: ✓ Belief: ✓
Argument 3 Argument 4
Either the sun is yellow or it is blue. Either the sea is blue or it is pink.
Suppose the sun is not yellow. Suppose the sea is not pink.
Does it follow that the sun is not blue? Does it follow that the sea is not blue?
Logic: X Belief: ✓ Logic: X Belief: X
Disjunctive Type B Disjunctive Type B
Argument 1 Argument 2
Either the sea is blue or it is pink. Either the sun is yellow or it is blue.
Suppose the sea is pink. Suppose the sun is yellow.
Does it follow that the sea is not blue? Does it follow that the sun is not blue?
Logic: ✓ Belief: X Logic: ✓ Belief: ✓
Argument 3 Argument 4
Either the sea is blue or it is pink. Either the sun is yellow or it is blue.
Suppose the sea is pink. Suppose the sun is yellow.
Does it follow that the sea is blue? Does it follow that the sun is blue?
Logic: X Belief: ✓ Logic: X Belief: X
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for MP judgments, instructions and problem type interacted
significantly, F(1, 65)= 9.613, p= .003, ηp
2= .129, with a big-
ger impact of conflict under belief instruction, which was also
confirmed for disjunctive judgments, F(1, 65)= 22.868, p<
.001, ηp
2= .260. Mean accuracy scores can be found in
Table 4. Finally, a significant interaction emerged between
complexity and problem type, F(1, 65)= 10.962, p= .002,
ηp
2= .144, showing that the difference between conflict and
no-conflict problems was larger for MPs than for disjunctives.
No other interactions were significant (all ps> .10).
Accuracy scores on the individual difference measure were
analyzed across both the experimental and control groups, but
as a between-subjects factor, by splitting the scorers into high
(N= 29) and low (N= 43) CRT groups. The five participants
removed for poor randomness scores were included in this set
of analyses (N= 72). The results showed no main effect of
CRT, F(2, 70)= 0.409, p= .524, ηp
2= .006, but did produce
a significant interaction between instructions and CRT, F(2,
70)= 4.024, p= .049, ηp
2= .054, showing a bigger difference
between the high- and low-CRT groups for logic judgments
(90% high vs. 85% low) than for belief judgments (80% high
vs. 81% low), and amarginally significant interaction between
problem type and CRT, F(2, 70)= 3.235, p= .076, ηp
2= .044,
with less of an effect of conflict in the high-CRT group (81%
conflict vs. 90% no conflict) than in the low-CRT group (77%
conflict vs. 90% no conflict); see Table 5. The latencies did
not produce any significant interactions with CRT.
A mixed-design ANOVA carried out on the latency data
showed no main effect of instructions, F(1, 65)= .808, p=
.372, ηp
2= .012, and no main effect of problem type, F(1,
65)= 2.611, p= .111, ηp
2= .039. There was, however, a sig-
nificant main effect of complexity, F(1, 65)= 66.329, p< .001,
ηp
2= .505, and a main effect of load, F(2, 65)= 21.506, p<
.001, ηp
2= .049, confirming that disjunctive arguments take
longer to solve than MP arguments and that participants take
significantly longer to produce responses when they are en-
gaged in a secondary task. The analysis did not produce any
significant interactions for the latency scores.
Discussion
Our aim in Experiment2 was to look at the effects of a sec-
ondary load on disjunctive arguments to determine whether
the relatively small impact of load in Experiment 1 would
extend to these more complex inferences. Additionally, we
were interested in the relationship between the CRT measure
and performance under different reasoning instructions. The
findings showed a robust effect of the secondary load for both
disjunctive and conditional argument types under both sets of
instructions. This suggests that both belief and logic judg-
ments require effortful processing. This outcome is in conflict
with the current accounts of reasoning, suggesting that belief-
based judgments are not available by default and depend upon
executive resources. As in Experiment1, the findings also rep-
licate earlier work, indicating that belief–logic conflict has a
greater influence on belief judgments. Taken together, these
findings are consistent with a parallel-processing model in
Table 4 Experiment2: Average accuracy and latency scores across the both groups for belief and logic instructions in each problem type, for modus
ponens (MP) and disjunctive arguments
Variable Belief Instructions Logic Instructions Overall Means
Conflict No Conflict Conflict No Conflict
RNG –MP
Average response (%) 68 91 81 91 83
Latency (ms) 7,747 7,517 7,898 7,376 7,635
Control –MP
Average response (%) 79 94 90 97 90
Latency (ms) 5,327 5,515 6,398 5,295 5,634
RNG – Disjunctives
Average response (%) 64 84 77 79 76
Latency (ms) 9,443 9,518 9,652 8,945 9,390
Control – Disjunctives
Average response (%) 75 89 88 92 86
Latency (ms) 7,431 7,552 6,878 6,781 7,161
Mean accuracy (%)
(across each cell)
72 90 84 90
Mean latency (ms)
(across each cell)
7,487 7,526 7,707 7,099
RNG= random number generation (N= 31), control (N= 36)
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which both judgments draw upon executive resources in a
Type 2 (belief)/Type 2 (logic) conflict.
Although the effects were small, the CRT results suggest
that accuracy scores on belief judgments were virtually the
same across the groups, whereas the high-CRT scorers per-
formed significantly better on the logic-based arguments, im-
plying that the cognitive demands associated with the CRT
relate to logic-based reasoning more than to belief-based rea-
soning. This may suggest that distinct executive resources
(e.g., inhibition vs. memory updating; see Miyake et al.
2000) are required for belief and logic judgments, an issue
that we will return to in the General Discussion.
A characteristic of the experimental task was that participants
were often required to switch from trial to trial between responses
based upon logic or beliefs. There is good experimental evidence
that task switching is demanding of executive resources. One
possibility is that RNG impacts performance because of this
task-switching requirement. In Experiment3, we manipulated in-
structions in a blocked design in order to evaluate the influence of
RNG under belief and logic instructions when there was no re-
quirement to switch between response types. A blocked design
also allowed an evaluation of performance on the secondary task
as a function of the primary-task requirements. This is important,
given that participants will often sacrifice performance on one
task in favor of maintaining performance on the other (Gilhooly
et al., 1993; Gilhooly, Logie,&Wynn, 2002; Phillips, 1999). One
possibility is that the trade-off between the primary and secondary
tasks differs as a function of the judgments being made.
Experiment 3
Task switching or shifting is an executive function defined by
our ability to disengage from an irrelevant task and subsequently
to actively engage in a relevant task (Miyake et al., 2000).
Others have argued that shifting should be defined as our ability
to perform a new operation in the face of proactive interference
from having performed a different operation on the same stimuli
(Allport & Wylie, 2000). Either way, shifting between mental
states is considered an important aspect of executive control
required for adequate performance on executive tasks such as
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (Miyake et al., 2000).
Furthermore, shifting has been shown to sustain considerable
temporal costs (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Consequently,
switching between two instructional sets could impact on both
accuracy and latency scores. Therefore, in Experiment3 we
aimed to control for this possibility, by administering the prob-
lems in a blocked design. This would eliminate switching de-
mands and also allow us to interpret performance on the second-
ary task by analyzing the randomness data for each condition.
The design should provide a clearer indication of the impact that
RNG has on reasoning performance and allow us to examine the
impact of logic and belief judgments on RNG performance.
Method
Participants
The participants were 71 undergraduates from the University
of Plymouth (20 male and 51 female, mean age= 20 years)
who took part in exchange for course credits.
Design and materials
A 2 (Instructions) × 2 (Problem Type) × 2 (Complexity) × 2
(Load) mixed block design was used in which participants
were randomly assigned to the RNG (load) or the control
(no load) group. Each participant received the 128 reasoning
problems from Experiment2, both MP and disjunctive argu-
ments (Complexity factor) under both belief and logic instruc-
tions (Instructions), which consisted of both conflict and no-
conflict problems (Problem Type).
Reasoning taskA blocked design was used, whereby the 128
problems from Experiment2 were separated into four blocks
of 32 arguments. Each block consisted of 16 MP arguments
and 16 disjunctives; in two of the blocks, participants received
belief instructions only, and in two of the blocks, logic instruc-
tions only. In each belief block, 16 conclusions were
believable and 16 were unbelievable. In the logic blocks, 16
conclusions were valid and 16 were invalid. Each participant
was presented with two belief blocks and two logic blocks, but
Table 5 Average accuracy scores in Experiment2 for belief and logic instructions for conflict and no-conflict items across high and low Cognitive
Reflection Task (CRT) scorers
Variable Belief Instructions Logic Instructions Overall Means
Conflict No Conflict Conflict No Conflict
High-CRT average response (%) 71 89 90 90 85
Low-CRT average response (%) 73 89 80 90 83
Mean accuracy (%)
(across each cell)
72 89 85 90
The results exclude below chance accuracy scores
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participants were randomly allocated to the belief-first or log-
ic-first order. The content of the blocks alternated, so that the
belief-first group were presented with Block 1 under belief
instructions, Block 2 under logic instructions, Block 3 under
belief instructions, and Block 4 under logic instructions. For
the logic-first groups, the reverse order applied. The problems
were counterbalanced in the same way as in Experiments 1
and 2.
Random number generationWe used the samemethod as in
Experiment 2.
Individual difference measures The CRT, which consisted
of the three questions presented in Experiment 2, was admin-
istered to each participant in paper format.
Procedure
Before starting the reasoning task, each participant was re-
quired to generate a baseline set of random numbers for a total
of 5 min. This set of numbers provided a baseline measure of
the randomness indices that could be compared against each
experimental block. The control group were also asked to
provide a baseline measure, but only as a way of ensuring that
both groups (RNG and control) started the reasoning ques-
tions at the same level of cognitive fatigue following the 5-
min task. The 5-min interval was based on previous analysis
demonstrating that without a secondary load, participants
would take an average of 5 min to complete 32 questions,
which was the number of problems allocated to each experi-
mental block.
The instructions were altered to incorporate the baseline
measure for each participant. A 5-min timer was built into
the computer program, which would automatically instruct
the participants to stop counting when the time was up and
proceed to the next part of the experiment. The experiment
concluded with each participant completing the CRT.
The RGCalc program was used to analyze the randomness
of the numbers generated by each participant (see Exp.1).
Since we were measuring randomness and articulation speed,
we did not exclude participants for being too slow or for poor
randomness scores when analyzing the secondary task.
Participants received a score between 0 and 3 for their perfor-
mance on the CRT.
Results
As in Experiment2, we eliminated those that scored 50% or
below on the conflict items for both the RNG and control
groups. A total of ten participants were eliminated, six from
the RNG group and four from the control group, which gave
us totals of N= 30 in the RNG group and N= 31 in the control
group.
Randomness data
We looked at the overall randomness indices across the three
Bprimary-task^ conditions (belief instructions, logic
instructions, and baseline; see Table 6). To compare the three
independent variables of randomness, a multivariate ANOVA
was carried out to control for Type I errors. The results showed
a significant difference in randomness indices for the primary
task, F(6, 208)= 5.386, p< .001, ηp
2= .136. Separate
ANOVAs indicated that the primary task had a statistically
significant effect on redundancy scores, F(2, 105)= 17.316,
p< .001, ηp
2= .248, but not on adjacency scores, F(2, 105)=
0.458, p= .634, ηp
2= .009, or RNG scores, F(2, 105)= 0.024,
p= .976, ηp
2< .001. Post-hoc analysis showed that significant
differences on redundancy scores occurred between baseline
and logic instructions (p< .001) and baseline and belief in-
structions (p< .001), but not between belief and logic instruc-
tions (p= .673). The adjacency and RNG scores were not
significantly different across the three primary tasks.
Therefore, the randomness data demonstrated that RNG per-
formance was equivalent across the two instructional
conditions.
Accuracy data
A mixed-design ANOVA on arcsine-transformed accuracy
scores uncovered a main effect of instructions, F(1, 59)=
14.359, p< .001, ηp
2= .196, confirming that performance
was better under logic instructions (88% vs. 82%). We also
found a main effect of problem type, F(1, 59)= 40.138, p<
.001, ηp
2= .405, showing poorer performance on conflict
items (80% vs. 90%). A main effect of complexity also
emerged, F(1, 59)= 22.195, p< .001, ηp
2= .273, with MP
producing higher accuracy rates (87% vs. 83%), and a main
effect of load, F(2, 59)= 8.525, p= .005, ηp
2= .126, with RNG
reducing accuracy scores (81% vs. 89%), replicating all of the
main effects of Experiment2. See Table 7 for all accuracy and
latency results.
We also observed an interaction between instructions and
problem type, F(2, 59)= 9.778, p= .003, ηp
2= .142, again
demonstrating that belief–logic conflict had more of an impact
on judgments concerning the believability of the conclusion
(74% believability–conflict vs. 90% believability–no
Table 6 Average scores (in percentages) across each measure of
randomness for the baseline and experimental conditions in Experiment3
Variable Baseline Belief Instructions Logic Instructions
Redundancy (%) 1 4 4
RNG (%) 32 34 34
Adjacency (%) 58 57 58
RNG= random number generation
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conflict), rather than its validity (85% logic–conflict vs. 91%
logic–no conflict). However, load had a larger impact on
logic-based judgments (82% load vs. 93% no load) than on
belief-based judgments (79% load vs. 85% no load), as was
indicated by an instruction by load interaction, F(2, 59)=
7.295, p= .009, ηp
2= .110.
Latency data
Analysis carried out on the response latencies produced the
following results: a main effect of instructions, F(1, 59)=
5.786, p= .019, ηp
2= .089, indicating that belief-based judg-
ments took less time to complete (5,458 vs. 6,007 ms), in
contrast to Experiments 1 and 2. There was also a main effect
of complexity, F(1, 59)= 108.661, p< .001, ηp
2= .648, with
disjunctive arguments taking longer to process than condition-
al arguments (6,502 vs. 4,962 ms), and a main effect of load,
F(2, 59)= 16.596, p< .001, ηp
2= .220, with longer latencies in
the RNG group (6,520 vs. 4,944 ms). We observed no signif-
icant interactions (all ps> .10).
Individual difference measure
Accuracy data Analysis on the CRT scores produced a mar-
ginally significant interaction between instructions, problem
type, and CRT, F(2, 59)= 3.774, p= .057, ηp
2= .060. In order
to explore this interaction, both the high (N= 37) and low (N=
24) CRT groups were analyzed separately with two 2
(Problem Type) × 2 (Instructions) × 2 (Complexity) repeated
measures ANOVAs. The results showed an Instructions ×
Problem Type interaction for the high-CRT group, F(1, 36)=
14.032, p= .001, ηp
2= .280, with conflict having a bigger
impact on believability than on logic judgments (see
Table 8). The interaction suggested that the belief–logic con-
flict had more of an impact on believability for those with
superior cognitive reflection. In other words, high CRTscorers
were more biased by logic under belief instructions. The la-
tencies did not produce any significant interactions with CRT.
Discussion
In Experiment3, a blocked design was adopted in order to
minimize the impact of switching demands on task perfor-
mance. The idea was to evaluate the impact of RNG on the
primary task, independent of the requirement for participants
to switch instructional sets as a function of the response op-
tions presented. Interestingly, in line with Handley et al.
(2011), the impact of conflict was greatest under belief in-
structions, suggesting that even when participants are aware
from trial to trial that they only needed to respond on the basis
of the believability of the conclusion, a competing logical
structure continued to interfere with their ability to do so.
Surprisingly, given the greater difficulty of responding on
the basis of beliefs, the impact of RNG was greatest under
logic instructions. This did not arise because participants were
differentially allocating resources across the primary and sec-
ondary tasks. Although redundancy was greater in the random
sequences generated under secondary-task conditions, we
found no evidence that this differed across instructional con-
ditions. The differential impacts of RNG on logic judgments
were reflected in an interaction between load and instructions.
This contrasted with Experiments 1 and 2, in which a main
effect of load was observed in the absence of an interaction.
It is important to be confident that the absence of an inter-
action in Experiments 1 and 2 was not the result of a lack of
power. Consequently, we completed a post-hoc power
Table 7 Experiment3: Average accuracy and latency scores, across both groups, for belief and logic instructions in each problem type for modus
ponens (MP) and disjunctives (Disj)
Variable Belief Instructions Logic Instructions Overall Means
Conflict No Conflict Conflict No Conflict
MP Dis MP Disj MP Disj MP Disj
RNG
Response accuracy (%) 74 70 87 84 82 77 90 80 81
Latency (ms) 5,460 6,858 5,191 6,743 5,644 7,672 6,408 8,185 6,520
Control
Response accuracy (%) 78 75 94 92 91 90 97 95 89
Latency (ms) 4,263 5,841 3,962 5,350 4,511 5,775 4,263 5,596 4,945
Mean accuracy (%)
(across each cell)
76 73 91 88 87 84 94 88
Mean latency (ms)
(across each cell)
4,861 6,350 4,577 6,047 5,078 6,724 5,336 6,891
The results exclude below chance scores and include correct only latencies. RNG= random number generation (N= 30), control (N= 31)
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analysis of Experiments 1 and 2 based on the effect size ob-
served in Experiment3. This demonstrated that with N= 70 in
Experiment1 and N= 67 in Experiment2, there was adequate
power (.8) to detect a medium effect size of the kind observed
in Experiment3, and yet both experiments failed to detect any
interaction between instruction and load.
One other important observation in Experiment3 was that
belief judgments were significantly quicker than logic judg-
ments, in contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, in which trials were
interspersed. In the General Discussion, we will reflect on
these findings while also considering the implications of the
CRT findings for understanding the processes underpinning
belief and logic judgments.
General discussion
The objective of the experiments presented here was to evaluate
the degree to which logic and beliefs interfere with one another
when participants were engaged in a secondary task that bur-
dened working memory resources. Previous research has shown,
contrary to the default interventionist dual-process account, that
participants made more errors and generally took longer to judge
the believability of a conclusion when this conclusion conflicted
with what was logically entailed. The three experiments in this
article have also demonstrated that belief-based judgments on
conflict items produce more errors than logic-based judgments
and that conflict between belief and logic results in a greater
impact on judging the believability of a conclusion.
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that RNG affects both belief
and logic judgments, suggesting that both depend on effortful
processing. Experiment 3 employed a blocked design to elimi-
nate possible switching demands on the reasoning task.
Interestingly, the principal findings regarding accuracywere rep-
licated in the blocked design, but RNG only impacted signifi-
cantly on the logic judgments. Importantly, the impact of RNG
was not linked to the resolution of conflict, since there was no
evidence of greater effects of the secondary task on conflict than
on no-conflict items. This suggests that RNG interfered with the
structural processing underpinning logical judgments rather than
with the resolution of conflict between competing responses. It
is worth noting that, despite an effect of secondary load, logical
accuracy on these problems remained high. Given the relative
simplicity of the arguments used, this is perhaps unsurprising;
however, it does suggest that even simple conditional and dis-
junctive inferences require some cognitive effort.
A common argument in the dual-process literature is that
logical reasoning is effortful and belief judgments are less so;
however, the behavioral data we have presented suggest other-
wise. Howmight we reconcile the accuracy data, which suggest
that belief judgments are most demanding, with the secondary-
task data, which show greatest interference with logic judg-
ments? In our view, the data are consistent with a Type 2/
Type 2 conflict that arises because of competing responses.
We suggest that the logical response is available early, but nev-
ertheless requires participants to effortfully reason from the un-
derlying structure of the presented argument. This claim is con-
sistent with research that has linked reasoning from simple prop-
ositional arguments with measures of cognitive ability (see, e.g.,
Newstead, Handley, Harley, Wright, & Farrelly, 2004). In con-
trast, the belief-based response is available later, and successful
responding depends on the inhibition of an available and com-
peting response. The critical feature of this account is that both
types of judgments depend on Type 2 processing, but rely on
distinct executive resources. This account is consistent with a
newly developed parallel competitive model (Handley et al.,
2011; Handley & Trippas, 2015), which suggests that both
belief- and logic-based judgments are activated early but, in
order to answer according to beliefs, a readily available logical
response requires inhibition. This would explain why conflict
between belief and logic consistently results in a greater impact
on judgments of conclusion believability.
However, it is important to note that belief judgments were
not consistently slower than logic judgments; in fact, the pat-
tern reversed in Experiment3 when problems were presented
in a blocked design. Despite this, the greater effect of conflict
under belief instructions remained. Interestingly, this pattern
was also observed in Experiments 1 and 2 of Handley et al.
(2011), in which participants were also presented problems in
a blocked design or with an instructional cue prior to item
Table 8 Average accuracy scores in Experiment3 for belief and logic instructions for conflict and no-conflict items across high and low Cognitive
Reflection Task (CRT) scorers
Variable Belief Instructions Logic Instructions Overall Means
Conflict No Conflict Conflict No Conflict
High-CRT average response (%) 74 92 86 91 86
Low-CRT average response (%) 75 86 83 90 84
Mean accuracy (%)
(across each cell)
75 89 85 91
The results exclude below chance accuracy scores
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presentation. Handley et al. (2011) argued that these design
features allow the development of a shortcut strategy on belief
items, whereby a response could be generated by simply re-
ferring to the categorical premise and conclusion (on MP
items) or the conclusion alone (on disjunctive arguments). If
some participants adopted this strategy, it would explain the
reduced latencies in Experiment 3.
How, then, do we reconcile our findings with traditional
belief-bias studies that have shown belief bias increasing under
time pressure (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005) or under cogni-
tive load (De Neys, 2006)? We argue that beliefs do not neces-
sarily function through the activation of a Type 1, default pro-
cess. The degree of interference of beliefs with reasoning will
depend upon the complexity of the logical reasoning required
(seeHandley&Trippas, 2015, for a detailedmodel). The greater
the complexity of the logical reasoning, the longer the process
will take, and the greater the opportunity for beliefs to interfere
with reasoning. Hence, the belief bias observed on complex
syllogisms arises because the logical processes take longer to
complete, so that a belief-based response is available prior to a
logical one. On simpler logical problems, when participants are
instructed to reason on the basis of belief, the fast-completing
logical response interferes with a belief-based output.
A key characteristic of the RNG task is that the successful
generation of random numbers depends on minimizing struc-
ture in the sequence of responses generated. The task also
requires updating of working memory to ensure that generated
sequences do not repeat previous ones. It is our conjecture that
RNG consequently interferes with the ability to extract the
underlying structure of an argument required for processing
the validity of an inference, but does not impact upon the
capacity to inhibit the logical response—hence, the larger ef-
fect of RNG on logic-based judgments in Experiment3. Given
this explanation, an interesting topic for future research might
focus on examining the impact of different types of secondary
tasks on performance. For example, we might expect less
interference from a task that placesminimal demands on struc-
tural processing (e.g., the dot memory task; De Neys, 2006).
In order to explain the shift from the main effect of load
(Exps. 1 and 2) to its increased impact on logic judgments, we
have assumed that the switching between instructional sets
(disengaging from one irrelevant task and effectively engag-
ing in a relevant one) places additional demands on executive
resources. These switching demands combined with RNG in-
crease the executive demands of the task consequently
impacting upon both types of judgment.
Aswe argued above, this account implicates effortful process-
ing in both judgments types and a distinction in the executive
resources required for each type of judgment. This proposal re-
ceives some support from the results of the CRT (Frederick,
2005). In Experiment2, participants with high CRT scores show
higher accuracy on logical judgments. Similarly, in Experiment3
high CRT is associated with a greater impact of conflict on belief
judgments. Both effects suggest that higher CRT scores are as-
sociated with greater sensitivity to logical structure. Interestingly,
the data do not show that the CRT is linked to less belief bias
under logical instructions. This suggests that successful perfor-
mance on the CRT relates to a person’s ability to extract the core
structure of the problem in order to make the correct judgment.
The evidence of a relationship between high CRT and logical
judgments supports the idea that CRT reflects sensitivity toward
the underlying structure of an argument.
Furthermore, we found some evidence to suggest that that
high CRT scorers were less random on the secondary task (i.e.,
higher RNG scores) as their performance under logical instruc-
tions increased, r(19)= .652, p= .002, which implies that struc-
tural processing impaired their ability to generate random re-
sponse alternatives. In contrast, the low-CRT group showed
the opposite trend, r(35)= –.511, p= .043. Therefore, the results
suggest that those with higher reflective ability are not more
proficient at overcoming conflict but are better at extracting
the underlying structure of a problem, which interferes with their
ability to abandon structural processing on the secondary task.
Could there be an alternative explanation for our findings?
Is it possible, for example, that explicitly instructing partici-
pants to make judgments on the basis of belief changes the
nature of the processes involved, perhaps leading participants
to engage in an explicit Type 2 process of belief evaluation?
Although we cannot fully discount this possibility, it is impor-
tant to note that belief judgments are more prone to errors and
generally take longer than logic judgments. Even though par-
ticipants are explicitly instructed to give belief responses,
there is still no basis to expect these judgments to result in
more errors and to be subject to greater interference from
conflict than are logical judgments. At the very least, the find-
ings show that explicit belief judgments are subject to logical
interference, which in itself is a novel finding. One way of
determining whether the same processes underlie explicit be-
lief judgments and Bbelief-biased^ responses under logical
instructions is to examine the latencies associated with each
type of response. If different processes underpin each judg-
ment then one would expect the former to take longer than the
latter. We reanalyzed latencies for conflict problems from
Experiment3, in which the blocked design allowed a cleaner
evaluation of latencies for correct and incorrect responses.
Surprisingly, the latencies associated with incorrect Bbelief-
biased^ responses to conflict problems under logical instruc-
tions (M= 6,249 ms) were, if anything, slightly longer than the
latencies associated with correct belief-based responses under
belief instructions (M= 5,707 ms), although this difference
was not reliable, t(47)= 1.07, p= .29.1 The absence of a
1 Note that the degrees of freedom for this comparison reflect a reduced
sample size, given that a number of participants did not make any errors to
logic conflict problems, and hence they were not included in the
comparison.
Mem Cogn (2016) 44:330–349 343
difference in latencies as a function of response category is
inconsistent with an explanation of the findings based on a
switch to deliberative belief-based reasoning under
instruction.
Is it possible instead that the difficulty of belief conflict
judgments arises because of the requirement to regularly
switch from logic- to belief-based trials? Perhaps the inhibi-
tion of beliefs on logic trials has negative consequences for
subsequent trials in which beliefs have to be activated?
Fortunately, the blocked design of Experiment3 allowed a
direct test of this possibility, through an analysis of the first
two blocks. Recall that participants received the problem
blocks in counterbalanced order, so that half of the participants
received a logic block followed by a belief block, and the
remaining group received the same problems in reverse order.
If the completion of logic trials interferes with subsequent
belief trials, we would expect the second block of belief judg-
ments to be more difficult than the first. We reanalyzed the
first two blocks of Experiment3, including order (belief items
first or logic items first) as an additional variable. Importantly,
the analysis revealed an interaction between problem type and
instructions, F(1, 57)= 7.44, p< .01, ηp
2= .115, once again
showing that conflict had more of an impact on belief judg-
ments (75% believability–conflict vs. 90% believability–no
conflict ) than logic judgments (87% logic–conflict vs. 90%
logic–no conflict). Of key relevance here, we also found an
interaction between instructions and order, F(1, 57)= 10.77, p
< .01, ηp
2= .19. However, there was no evidence that com-
pleting a logic block first led to poorer performance on a
subsequent block of belief problems. In fact, performance on
the second block of belief problems was, if anything, slightly
improved after a block of logic problems (M= 86%), as com-
pared to the first block of belief problems (M= 80%), although
this difference was not significant, F(2, 57)= 1.769, p= .189,
ηp
2= .030. We observed a similar improvement in perfor-
mance in logical reasoning, with the second block of logic
problems showing higher accuracy after a block of belief
problems (M= 92%), as compared to the first block of logic
problems (M= 85%). In this case, the difference was reliable,
F(2, 57)= 4.278, p= .043, ηp
2= .070. This analysis principally
shows a practice effect, whereby participants are more accu-
rate on the second block of problems, irrespective of the block
they received first. There is no evidence that inhibiting beliefs
on a block of logic problems subsequently leads to poorer
performance in judging believability.
Finally, we consider whether the believability of the prob-
lem premises might explain some of our findings. A charac-
teristic of the conflict problems is that the premises are always
unbelievable. Perhaps making judgments from unbelievable
premises results in more deliberative processing, and conse-
quently explains the impact of secondary load on perfor-
mance? Once again, our findings are inconsistent with this
suggestion; load did not differentially impact problem type,
signifying that load does not uniquely interfere with conflict
problems that have unbelievable premises. Is it possible, in-
stead, that participantsmisunderstood the belief instructions or
were confused by them, and consequently performed poorly
on these items? Once again, our data suggest not. Participants
showed excellent levels of accuracy on no-conflict belief
items, suggesting that they were clearly able to evaluate the
believability of the presented conclusions in response to the
cue provided. Although a number of participants were re-
moved from the analysis because their accuracy on conflict
items was at chance level, a significant proportion of partici-
pants across the experiments were eliminated because of
below-chance performance on logic conflict items (36%).
Although a greater proportion (54%) showed chance or
below-chance performance on belief judgments, this simply
reflects the fact that belief conflict items were more difficult to
solve than their logical counterparts.
It is important to note that our account does not necessitate
abandoning a dual-process approach to reasoning. We agree
that often there can be competing cues to a solution and that
this can lead to error. Where our account differs is that we
assume that both belief- and logic-based judgments depend
on Type 1 and Type 2 processes and that interference can as
readily arise between logic and beliefs as the other way
around. Some researchers have, in contrast, argued that the
evidence used to support separate systems is more consistent
with a single-system account (see, e.g., Kruglanski &
Gigerenzer, 2011; Osman, 2004). Keren and Schul (2009)
proposed a uni-model and argued that the presence of conflict
is not adequate evidence for two independent systems. They
suggest that the belief-bias effect can be explained by assum-
ing that logical validity and believability are two distinct types
of external criteria that a single system can use to evaluate a
conclusion, and that the level or awareness of alternative re-
sponses fluctuates continuously when one is reasoning. In
other words, a single system can shift between many mental
states to solve different tasks, and these states are defined by
an assembly of different features such as speed, level of con-
trol, and awareness. In some respects, this account is not a bad
fit to the data presented here, and it has some elements in
common with the parallel-processing model, such as the pro-
posal that conflict arises through the activation of competing
cues to the solution. However, we argue that there are advan-
tages in retaining the distinction between Type 1 and Type 2
processes, since inevitably, certain judgments will require
greater reliance on explicit processing than others.
Conclusion
The overall aim of this article was to establish whether engag-
ing in a secondary task while reasoning on the basis of belief
or logic would have differential impacts on performance. Our
findings suggest that responding under both instruction types
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requires some effortful processing, which is inconsistent with
prototypical dual-process accounts of belief bias. The fact that
logic has a greater impact on judging the believability of a
conclusion suggests that logical inferences can be accom-
plished rapidly, hence interfering with belief-based
judgments. The impact of a complex executive load on
simple logical judgments suggests that even these draw
on cognitive resources. A task for future research will
be to map the distinct executive demands of reasoning
on the basis of beliefs or logical structure.
Appendix A: Experiments 1–3, modus ponens
stimuli
The full 64 conditional arguments are listed below. In each
experiment, one group received half under logic instructions
and the other half under belief instructions, and these
assignments were counterbalanced against the second group
in each experiment.
Experimental trial stimuli
Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion
If a child is crying, then it is happy. Suppose a child is crying. Does it follow that the child is sad?
If a child is crying, then it is happy. Suppose a child is crying. Does it follow that the child is happy?
If a child is crying, then it is sad. Suppose a child is crying. Does it follow that the child is happy?
If a child is crying, then it is sad. Suppose a child is crying. Does it follow that the child is sad?
If a dog is barking, then it is silent. Suppose a dog is barking. Does it follow that the dog is silent?
If a dog is barking, then it is silent. Suppose a dog is barking. Does it follow that the dog is loud?
If a dog is barking, then it is loud. Suppose a dog is barking. Does it follow that the dog is loud?
If a dog is barking, then it is loud. Suppose a dog is barking. Does it follow that the dog is silent?
If a person is swimming, then he is dry. Suppose a person is swimming. Does it follow that the person is wet?
If a person is swimming, then he is dry. Suppose a person is swimming. Does it follow that the person is dry?
If a person is swimming, then he is wet. Suppose a person is swimming. Does it follow that the person is dry?
If a person is swimming, then he is wet. Suppose a person is swimming. Does it follow that the person is wet?
If the sky is grey, then it is sunny. Suppose the sky is grey. Does it follow that it is cloudy?
If the sky is grey, then it is sunny. Suppose the sky is grey. Does it follow that it is sunny?
If the sky is grey, then it is cloudy. Suppose the sky is grey. Does it follow that it is sunny?
If the sky is grey, then it is cloudy. Suppose the sky is grey. Does it follow that it is cloudy?
If a new computer is high-end, then it is cheap. Suppose a new computer is high-end. Does it follow that the new computer is
expensive?
If a new computer is high-end, then it is cheap. Suppose a new computer is high-end. Does it follow that the new computer is cheap?
If a computer is high-end, then it is expensive. Suppose a new computer is high-end. Does it follow that the new computer is
expensive?
If a computer is high-end, then it is expensive. Suppose a new computer is high-end. Does it follow that the new computer is cheap?
If a person eats too much, then they are skinny. Suppose a person eats too much. Does it follow that the person is skinny?
If a person eats too much, then they are skinny. Suppose a person eats too much. Does it follow that the person is fat?
If a person eats too much, then they are fat. Suppose a person eats too much. Does it follow that the person is skinny?
If a person eats too much, then they are fat. Suppose a person eats too much. Does it follow that the person is fat?
If a glass falls on the floor then it is intact. Suppose a glass falls on the floor. Does it follow that the glass is intact?
If a glass falls on the floor then it is intact. Suppose a glass falls on the floor. Does it follow that the glass is broken?
If a glass falls on the floor then it is broken. Suppose a glass falls on the floor. Does it follow that the glass is intact?
If a glass falls on the floor then it is broken. Suppose a glass falls on the floor. Does it follow that the glass is broken?
If the light switch is on, then it is dark inside. Suppose the light switch is on. Does it follow that it is dark inside?
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Appendix B: Experiments 2–3, disjunctive stimuli
The full 64 disjunctive arguments are listed below. In each
experiment, one group received half under logic instructions
and the other half under belief instructions, and these
assignments were counterbalanced against the second group
in each experiment.
(continued)
If the light switch is on, then it is dark inside. Suppose the light switch is on. Does it follow that it is bright inside?
If the light switch is on, then it is bright inside. Suppose the light switch is on. Does it follow that it is bright inside?
If the light switch is on, then it is bright inside. Suppose the light switch is on. Does it follow that it is dark inside?
If a singer has a sore throat, his singing will be nice. Suppose the singer has a sore throat. Does it follow that his singing will be nice?
If a singer has a sore throat, his singing will be nice. Suppose the singer has a sore throat. Does it follow that his singing will be bad?
If a singer has a sore throat, his singing will be bad. Suppose the singer has a sore throat. Does it follow that his singing will be bad?
If a singer has a sore throat, his singing will be bad. Suppose the singer has a sore throat. Does it follow that his singing will be nice?
If an aeroplane runs out of fuel, then it will fly. Suppose an aeroplane runs out of fuel. Does it follow that the aeroplane will fly?
If an aeroplane runs out of fuel, then it will fly. Suppose an aeroplane runs out of fuel. Does it follow that the aeroplane will crash?
If an aeroplane runs out of fuel, then it will crash. Suppose an aeroplane runs out of fuel. Does it follow that the aeroplane will fly?
If an aeroplane runs out of fuel, then it will crash. Suppose an aeroplane runs out of fuel. Does it follow that the aeroplane will crash?
If heat bill has not been paid in time then it is
warm inside.
Suppose the heat bill has not been paid
in time.
Does it follow that it is cold inside?
If heat bill has not been paid in time then it is
warm inside.
Suppose the heat bill has not been paid in time. Does it follow that it is warm inside?
If the heat bill has not been paid in time then it is
cold inside.
Suppose the heat bill has not been paid in time. Does it follow that it is warm inside?
If heat bill has not been paid in time then it is
cold inside.
Suppose the heat bill has not been paid in time. Does it follow that it is cold inside?
If a bear catches a fish, it is slow. Suppose a bear catches a fish. Does it follow that the bear is slow?
If a bear catches a fish, it is slow. Suppose a bear catches a fish. Does it follow that the bear is quick?
If a bear catches a fish, it is quick. Suppose a bear catches a fish. Does it follow that the bear is quick?
If a bear catches a fish, it is quick. Suppose a bear catches a fish. Does it follow that the bear is slow?
If a toilet has been flushed, then it is dirty. Suppose a toilet is flushed. Does it follow that the toilet is clean?
If a toilet has been flushed, then it is dirty. Suppose a toilet is flushed. Does it follow that the toilet is dirty?
If a toilet has been flushed, then it is clean. Suppose a toilet is flushed. Does it follow that the toilet is clean?
If a toilet has been flushed, then it is clean. Suppose a toilet is flushed. Does it follow that the toilet is dirty?
If a tree is old, then it is small. Suppose a tree is old. Does it follow that the tree is small?
If a tree is old, then it is small. Suppose a tree is old. Does it follow that the tree is large?
If a tree is old, then it is large. Suppose a tree is old. Does it follow that the tree is large?
If a tree is old, then it is large. Suppose a tree is old. Does it follow that the tree is small?
If your mother bakes cookies, you will be sad. Suppose your mother bakes cookies. Does it follow that you will be happy?
If your mother bakes cookies, you will be sad. Suppose your mother bakes cookies. Does it follow that you will be sad?
If your mother bakes cookies, you will be happy. Suppose your mother bakes cookies. Does it follow that you will be sad?
If your mother bakes cookies, you will be happy. Suppose your mother bakes cookies. Does it follow that you will be happy?
If a hamster gets fed, then it will die. Suppose a hamster gets fed. Does it follow that the hamster will live?
If a hamster gets fed, then it will die. Suppose a hamster gets fed. Does it follow that the hamster will die?
If a hamster gets fed, then it will live. Suppose a hamster gets fed. Does it follow that the hamster will live?
If a hamster gets fed, then it will live. Suppose a hamster gets fed. Does it follow that the hamster will die?
Experimental trial stimuli
Premise 1 Premise 2 Conclusion Item
Type
Either cats are mammals or they are plants. Suppose a cat is not a mammal. Does it follow that the cat is not a plant? AFF
Either cats are mammals or they are plants. Suppose a cat is not a mammal. Does it follow that the cat is a plant? AFF
Either cats are mammals or they are plants. Suppose a cat is not a plant. Does it follow that the cat is not a mammal? AFF
Either cats are mammals or they are plants. Suppose a cat is not a plant. Does it follow that the cat is a mammal? AFF
Either the sky is blue or it is green. Suppose the sky is not blue. Does it follow that the sky is green? AFF
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Either the sky is blue or it is green. Suppose the sky is not blue. Does it follow that the sky is not green? AFF
Either the sky is blue or it is green. Suppose the sky is not green. Does it follow that the sky is blue? AFF
Either the sky is blue or it is green. Suppose the sky is not green. Does it follow that the sky is not blue? AFF
Either the sun is yellow or it is blue. Suppose the sun is blue. Does it follow that the sun is yellow? DEN
Either the sun is yellow or it is blue. Suppose the sun is blue. Does it follow that the sun is not yellow? DEN
Either the sun is yellow or it is blue. Suppose the sun is yellow. Does it follow that the sun is blue? DEN
Either the sun is yellow or it is blue. Suppose the sun is yellow. Does it follow that the sun is not blue? DEN
Either the sea is blue or it is pink. Suppose the sea is pink. Does it follow that the sea is not blue? DEN
Either the sea is blue or it is pink. Suppose the sea is pink. Does it follow that the sea is blue? DEN
Either the sea is blue or it is pink. Suppose the sea is blue. Does it follow that the sea is not pink? DEN
Either the sea is blue or it is pink. Suppose the sea is blue. Does it follow that the sea is pink? DEN
Either parrots can fly or they can swim. Suppose a parrot cannot fly. Does it follow that the parrot cannot swim? AFF
Either parrots can fly or they can swim. Suppose a parrot cannot fly. Does it follow that the parrot can swim? AFF
Either parrots can fly or they can swim. Suppose a parrot cannot swim. Does it follow that the parrot cannot fly? AFF
Either parrots can fly or they can swim. Suppose a parrot cannot swim. Does it follow that the parrot can fly? AFF
Either obese people are fat or they are skinny. Suppose an obese person is not fat. Does it follow that the obese person is skinny? AFF
Either obese people are fat or they are skinny. Suppose an obese person is not fat. Does it follow that the obese person is not skinny? AFF
Either obese people are fat or they are skinny. Suppose an obese person is not
skinny.
Does it follow that the obese person is fat? AFF
Either obese people are fat or they are skinny. Suppose an obese person is not
skinny.
Does it follow that the obese person is not fat? AFF
Either skyscrapers are huge or they are tiny. Suppose a skyscraper is not huge. Does it follow that the skyscraper is tiny? DEN
Either skyscrapers are huge or they are tiny. Suppose a skyscraper is not huge. Does it follow that the skyscraper is not tiny? DEN
Either skyscrapers are huge or they are tiny. Suppose a skyscraper is not tiny. Does it follow that the skyscraper is not huge? DEN
Either skyscrapers are huge or they are tiny. Suppose a skyscraper is not tiny. Does it follow that the skyscraper is huge? DEN
Either roses are flowers or they are machines. Suppose a rose is a machine. Does it follow that the rose is not a flower? DEN
Either roses are flowers or they are machines. Suppose a rose is a machine. Does it follow that the rose is a flower? DEN
Either roses are flowers or they are machines. Suppose a rose is a flower. Does it follow that the rose is not a machine? DEN
Either roses are flowers or they are machines. Suppose a rose is a flower. Does it follow that the rose is a machine? DEN
Either sentences are made out of words or they
are made out of bricks.
Suppose a sentence is not made
out of words.
Does it follow that the sentence is not made
out of bricks?
AFF
Either sentences are made out of words or they
are made out of bricks.
Suppose a sentence is not made
out of words.
Does it follow that the sentence is made out of
bricks?
AFF
Either sentences are made out of words or they
are made out of bricks.
Suppose a sentence is not made
out of bricks.
Does it follow that the sentence is not made
out of words?
AFF
Either sentences are made out of words or they
are made out of bricks.
Suppose a sentence is not made
out of bricks.
Does it follow that the sentence is made out of
words?
AFF
Either mice eat cheese or they eat steel. Suppose a mouse does not eat
cheese.
Does it follow that the mouse eats steel? AFF
Either mice eat cheese or they eat steel. Suppose a mouse does not eat
cheese.
Does it follow that the mouse does not eat steel? AFF
Either mice eat cheese or they eat steel. Suppose a mouse does not eat steel. Does it follow that the mouse eats cheese? AFF
Either mice eat cheese or they eat steel. Suppose a mouse does not eat steel. Does it follow that the mouse does not eat cheese? AFF
Either alligators eat meat or they eat plastic. Suppose an alligator eats plastic. Does it follow that the alligator does not eat meat? DEN
Either alligators eat meat or they eat plastic. Suppose an alligator eats plastic. Does it follow that the alligator eats meat? DEN
Either alligators eat meat or they eat plastic. Suppose an alligator eats meat. Does it follow that the alligator does not eat plastic? DEN
Either alligators eat meat or they eat plastic. Suppose an alligator eats meat. Does it follow that the alligator eats plastic? DEN
Either circles are round or they are square. Suppose a circle is square. Does it follow that the circle is round? DEN
Either circles are round or they are square. Suppose a circle is square. Does it follow that the circle not round? DEN
Either circles are round or they are square. Suppose a circle is round. Does it follow that the circle is square? DEN
Either circles are round or they are square. Suppose a circle is round. Does it follow that the circle is not square? DEN
Either monkeys are primates or
they are rodents.
Suppose a monkey is not a primate. Does it follow that the monkey is not a rodent? AFF
Either monkeys are primates or
they are rodents.
Suppose a monkey is not a primate. Does it follow that the monkey is a rodent? AFF
Either monkeys are primates or
they are rodents.
Suppose a monkey is not a rodent. Does it follow that the monkey is not a primate? AFF
Either monkeys are primates or
they are rodents.
Suppose a monkey is not a rodent. Does it follow that the monkey is a primate? AFF
Either flowers are organic or they are vehicles. Suppose a flower is not organic. Does it follow that the flower is a vehicle? AFF
Either flowers are organic or they are vehicles. Suppose a flower is not organic. Does it follow that the flower is not a vehicle? AFF
Either flowers are organic or they are vehicles. Suppose a flower is not a vehicle. Does it follow that the flower is organic? AFF
Either flowers are organic or they are vehicles. Suppose a flower is not a vehicle. Does it follow that the flower is not organic? AFF
Either shovels are tools or they are stationary. Suppose a shovel is stationary. Does it follow that the shovel is not a tool? DEN
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Either shovels are tools or they are stationary. Suppose a shovel is stationary. Does it follow that the shovel is a tool? DEN
Either shovels are tools or they are stationary. Suppose a shovel is a tool. Does it follow that the shovel is stationary? DEN
Either shovels are tools or they are stationary. Suppose a shovel is a tool. Does it follow that the shovel is not stationary? DEN
Either spears are weapons or they are
thermostats.
Suppose a spear is a thermostat. Does it follow that the spear is a weapon? DEN
Either spears are weapons or they are
thermostats.
Suppose a spear is a thermostat. Does it follow that the spear is not a weapon? DEN
Either spears are weapons or they are
thermostats.
Suppose a spear is a weapon. Does it follow that the spear is not a thermostat? DEN
Either spears are weapons or they are
thermostats.
Suppose a spear is a weapon. Does it follow that the spear is a thermostat? DEN
Item Type refers to the category of disjunctives used. AFFare disjunctives of the following type: A or B, not A, thereforeB. DEN are of a different type: A
or B, A, therefore not B.These are valid because they are exclusive disjunctives,meaningthat A and B can never be true at the same time.
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